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Two-way trade1. Introduction
Cross-border trade in electricity has unique characteristics: it is
constrained to an integrated wide-area transmission grid and it is
often two-way. A jurisdiction may import and export electricity over
the course of a year, a single day, or even at the same time if there are
multiple transmission lines (interties) across a border.
While conventional comparative advantage based on factor endow-
ments plays an important role in explaining one-way trade patterns,
two-way trade in electricity cannot be explained readily in conventional
models of international trade. This paper develops a new trade model
that captures two-way trade in a homogenous good, speciﬁcally for
electricity. This model introduces a novel motive for international
trade: trade as insurance. Stochastic demand variation coupled with
strongly upward-sloping (convex) marginal costs generates a new
type of gains from trade through a mechanism that is dubbed “recipro-
cal load smoothing” in analogy to the “reciprocal dumping” model of
two-way trade in homogenous goods introduced by Brander (1981)
and Brander and Krugman (1983). Whereas the motive for trade
under reciprocal dumping is strategic and rent-seeking in an65-2008-0017) strategic grant
e selection, efﬁcacy, incidence
er is accompanied by a detailed
ork aswell as numerous tables
d further empirical results (ro-
pace constraints of this paper. I
Copenhagen, Paris, Toulouse,
lar, I would like to acknowledge
ette Boom, Jim Brander, Jeffrey
cKenzie, Peter Møllgard, John
rthermore, I thank Jenny Wang
this research project.
. This is an open access article underoligopolistic market, themotive for trade under reciprocal load smooth-
ing is cost reduction under uncertainty. An array of empirical tests
strongly support the theoretical predictions and the economic signiﬁ-
cance of “reciprocal load smoothing.”
The trade theory developed in this paper connects closely to a new
stream of literature that tries to explain the frequent entries and exits
of exporters into foreign markets. Blum et al. (2013) link the occasional
entry and exit in particular foreign markets to increasing marginal
costs and stochastic demandwhen capital investments are ﬁxed; less ef-
ﬁcient ﬁrms are occasional exporters driven by demand ﬂuctuations,
while highly efﬁcientﬁrms investmore and becomeperennial exporters.
A related argument was developed in Blonigen andWilson (2010), who
have studied the role of excess capacity and cyclical dumping. Themodel
developed here relies on similar economic logic, although rather differ-
ent mechanisms.Whereas the aforementioned literature focuses on het-
erogeneous goods, the paper here focuses on a homogeneous good.
International trade in electricity is minuscule by the standard of
overall trade in goods and services. In 2011, exports of electricity
amounted to barely forty billion US Dollars (and 662 TWh), only about
0.225% of the nearly eighteen trillion US Dollars of worldwide trade. In
that year only 87 nations reported positive exports or imports. Yet
trade in electricity has become vital for many countries, and as Fig. 1
shows, in the last decade electricity trade has quadrupled.
Unlike other commodities, electricity cannot be stored; supply must
meet demand instantaneously. As a result, self-reliant jurisdictions need
to maintain sufﬁcient reserve generation capacity to meet peaks in
ﬂuctuating demand. International trade opens up opportunities to
reduce excessive reserve capacity as well as import electricity from
neighbouring countries that have a comparative advantage in electricity
generation due to favourable resource endowments. There are alsomar-
ket structure impediments. Despite signiﬁcant progress liberalizing
electricity markets and introducing new market mechanisms (Stoft,the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Total world exports of electricity. Source: UN Comtrade, HS 271600.
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Fig. 3. Canada–US electricity exports. Source: UN Comtrade, HS 271600.
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sufﬁciency mandates. Technologically, the main barrier to an increase
in international trade in electricity has been the problem of long-
distance power transmission. Cross-border trade in electricity is also
constrained by separate interconnections (wide area synchronous
grids) in North America, illustrated in Fig. 2. Interconnections resemble
free trade areas, and their separation resembles prohibitive tariffs.
The empirical analysis in this paper employs monthly data from
Canadian provinces' trade with US states between 2001 and 2013. The
geographic west–east alignment of Canadian provinces along the US
border allows for trade with neighbouring provinces as well as trade
with many US states. There is a limited number of cross-border trading
pairs. Among the ten Canadian provinces and 49 landlocked US states
plus DC, there are 500 potential trading pairs but only 75 actual trading
pairs. The extensive margin dominates the trading patterns.
Some stylized facts about bilateral Canada-US trade in electricity
may be worth bearing in mind, illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4. Canada
runs a trade surpluswith theUnited States,with US imports of Canadian
electricity about twice the volume of US exports to Canada. Prices can
ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly. The monthly averages, mostly in the $25–$70
per MWh range, can mask signiﬁcant price spikes such as those during
the California electricity crisis in 2001. Even negative prices are ob-
served occasionally—an extreme form of dumping. On average, Canadi-
an electricity commands an export price premium of about 20% despite
Canada's apparent comparative advantage in electricity production.Fig. 2. North American2. Theory
This section develops a model of an electric utility that is regulated
with respect to its domestic operation but is not constrained with re-
spect to earning proﬁts from engaging in cross-border trade in electric-
ity with a neighbouring foreign jurisdiction. The model of “reciprocal
load smoothing” developedhere introduces a novel type of comparative
advantage, one that is dynamic, variable, and short-term and results
from load asymmetries between jurisdictions. I will continue to use
the term ‘comparative advantage’ in the conventional Heckscher–
Ohlin sense, however, to refer to the ﬁxed long-term advantages from
factor endowments.
2.1. One jurisdiction
The starting point formodelling an electric utility is its cost function.
Power generation is characterized by a least-cost-ﬁrst approach to
deploying power plants. Base load utilizes power plants with low mar-
ginal cost such as hydroelectric dams, or nuclear power plants whose
output is difﬁcult to ramp up or down. Peak load utilizes power plants
with short ramping times but high fuel costs. A sufﬁciently general
cost function for electricity generation is
c q tð Þð Þ ¼ c0 þ c1q tð Þ þ c2q tð Þ2=2 ð1ÞElectricity Grid.
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44 W. Antweiler / Journal of International Economics 101 (2016) 42–51This cost function is quadratic in production q(t) over time t and
obeys the capacity constraint q(t)≤K. Making use of a quadratic cost
function is an essential feature of themodel because it facilitates apply-
ing properties of the normal distribution when exploring the stochastic
nature of q(t).1 In practice, the cost function is not smooth but a
sequence of step functions (Mansur, 2008, p 373). Nevertheless, a qua-
dratic function provides a reasonable approximation. The convexity of
the cost function imposes a directional cost asymmetry: generating
electricity is expensive when load utilization is high, and cheap when
it is low.
Demand for electricity is determined long-term and short-term.
Average demand q over a sufﬁciently long time period (assumed to be
a year) is governed by a linear demand function q ¼ a−bp, where the
utility price p is set by a utility commission. Many utilities still opt for
a relatively “ﬂat” pricing system.While peak-loadpricing is economical-
ly optimal, it is only slowly gaining ground. Even where it is used, con-
sumers respondmore to average than tomarginal electricity prices (Ito,
2014). Within the time period, short-term demand is determined sto-
chastically as qðtÞ  N ðq; s2Þ so that over the integration time period
[0,T], or equivalently over the probability distribution of demand f(q)
during the time period T, total supply is
Z T
0
q tð Þdt ¼ T
Z
f qð Þdq ¼ qT : ð2Þ
The utility's proﬁts over a ﬁscal year are given by
π ¼
Z
pq tð Þ−c q tð Þð Þ½ dt: ð3Þ
Because of the naturalmonopoly in electricity distribution, a utility's
proﬁts are usually constrained in some form (see Bernard and Roland,
1997). A common form is the ﬁxed mark-up where the retail price p is
set in such a way that the utility realizes a ﬁxed percentage mark-up
η. In that case, it can be shown that the utility's retail price for electricity
is a mark-up on marginal cost at average load plus a component for ab-
sorbing the ﬁxed cost and the cost of demand variability. More volatile
loads, captured by the variance s2, are associated with higher electricity
retail prices because of a stronger exposure to the cost asymmetry.21 Section A in the Technical Appendix provides a brief discussion of the expected value of
linear and quadratic transformations of random variables. The quadratic cost function is
particularly suited to exploiting this concept to derive analytically tractable solutions to
the utility's proﬁt maximization problem. Nevertheless, key results of this paper—in par-
ticular for the problem of electricity trade between two jurisdictions—can also be derived
with alternative cost functions. Section D in the Technical Appendix discusses a logarithmic
cost function that is based on capacity utilization (q/K).
2 See section A in the Technical Appendix for a mathematical derivation.With peak-load
pricing the demand ﬂuctuations would be dampened by consumers' adjustment to the
changing prices. This will change the time path for the actual loads q(t) and reduce its var-
iance s2. However, as Ito (2014) suggests, this effect may be smaller than generally
thought.2.2. Two jurisdictions
Now introduce two jurisdictions, home (h) and foreign (f), identiﬁed
by corresponding superscripts. At any given time t, the home jurisdic-
tion can export a ﬂow of electric power x(t) to the foreign jurisdiction.
A negative x(t) constitutes an import of electric power. Transporting
electricity across jurisdictional boundaries incurs a transmission cost
g |x | that is proportional to the volume (absolute value |x |) of electrical
power transmitted, with parameter g a function capturing distance D
between the jurisdictions. Without loss of generality it is assumed that
the transmission cost is split equally between exporter and importer.
Exports and imports are balanced through a market price p that will
ﬂuctuate over time. To manage notation, deﬁne the indicator variable
δ=1 when exporting (xN0) and δ=−1 when importing (xb0).
Assume that the utility maximizes proﬁts after satisfying purely do-
mestic demand. Under-utilized capacity K−q(t) can be used for export.
When the utility exports electricity, it earns revenue px and incurs an
additional cost c(q+x)−c(q), which increases progressively because
of the quadratic term in (1). When the utility imports electricity, it
buys quantity −x of electricity at price p and saves generation costs
c(q)−c(q− |x |) by moving down on its marginal cost curve. The
utility's export proﬁt function is therefore given by
πx ¼ px− c1 þ c2 qþ x=2ð Þ½ x−g xj j=2 ≥ 0 ð4Þ
Time arguments were dropped for expositional simpliﬁcation. Note
that g |x |=δgx remains positive both when exporting and importing.
The utility chooses x to maximize proﬁts and, in doing so, ignores the
impact of this choice on retail price (p). The ﬁrst-order condition for a
proﬁt maximum implies that
x ¼ p−c1−δg=2
c2
− q ð5Þ
subject to the non-negative proﬁt constraint. Applying the ﬁrst-order
condition, the utility will export electricity when the export price ex-
ceeds marginal cost, and import electricity when the import price is
lower than marginal cost:
p N c1 þ c2qþ g=2 export ð6Þ
p b c1 þ c2q−g=2 import ð7Þ
In equilibrium, home's exports must equal foreign's imports, and
thus it must hold that xh+xf=0 at any given time. Therefore, using
Eq. (5) for Home and Foreign,
p ¼ q
f þ qh ch2c f2 þ ch1c f2 þ ch2c f1
ch2 þ c f2
þ g
2
c f2−c
h
2
ch2 þ c f2

 ð8Þ
The equilibrium trading price is proportional to the sum of loads
qf+qh. It is highest when capacity utilization is high in both jurisdic-
tions. The trading price is a weighted average of marginal cost. The con-
stant part is a weighted arithmetic average of the linear cost terms c1,
with weights determined by the relative share of the trading partners'
quadratic cost terms. The variable part is a harmonic average of the qua-
dratic cost terms, multiplied by the combined load. The price also rises
with the transmission cost g, and this cost factor is magniﬁed by the
cross-border difference in quadratic cost factors.
Eq. (8) also explains how two-way trade can occur at a price differ-
ential between two jurisdictions, where exports in one direction occur
at higher prices on average than exports in the other direction. Consider
the case where Home has little variation in demand (qh) and where
Foreign has high variation in demand (qf). When demand is high in
Foreign, Foreign imports electricity from Home at a high cost. When
45W. Antweiler / Journal of International Economics 101 (2016) 42–51demand is low in Foreign, Foreign will export electricity to Home at a
low cost. The jurisdiction with the larger variation in demand is at a
trade disadvantage irrespective of underlying comparative advantage.
With the equilibrium price determined, the amount of electricity
exported or imported is
xh ¼
c f1 þ c f2qf
 
− ch1 þ ch2qh
 
−δg
ch2 þ c f2
ð9Þ
The home jurisdiction exports electricity when its marginal cost is
lower than the marginal cost of the foreign jurisdiction. The export or
import volume is diminished by the transmission cost.
Eq. (9) identiﬁes trading opportunities for both jurisdictions if mar-
ginal costs are sufﬁciently close. If one jurisdiction has a large compara-
tive advantage, trade will be unidirectional at all times. This can be the
case when one jurisdiction has a particularly cheap source of electric
power, such as hydroelectric dams. If the cost parameters for home
and foreign are identical and transmission losses are negligible (g=
0), it is just the capacity utilization that determines which jurisdiction
has a temporary comparative advantage, and xh=(qf−qh)/2. Both ju-
risdictions simply split the difference in the loads so that both operate
at the same level. In the presence of transmission costs, the volume of
trade diminishes in proportion to g (which depends on distanceH
H
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f
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b
Fig. 5. Electricity Trbetween the jurisdictions) and the convexity of the cost function (c2).
Trade will only occur when g is sufﬁciently small:
g b δ c f1 þ qf c f2
 
− ch1 þ qhch2
   ð10Þ
The difference in marginal costs must be sufﬁciently large to over-
come the transmission cost. More trading opportunities exist when
(a) home and foreign demand are wider apart, and when (b) the cost
function is more convex.
Fig. 5 illustrates the patterns of trade that emerge from the two in-
equalities (10) when δ=+1 for exporting and δ=−1 for importing.
The vertical axis depicts the home-foreign difference of the ﬁxed linear
term in the cost function, c1f−c1h. This can be considered the convention-
al comparative advantage. At the top of the diagram, Home has an
export advantage. When c1f−c1h is large enough, home will always ex-
port (above the blue dashed line). Conversely, when c1f−c1h is negative,
then Home will tend to import, and below a certain threshold (the red
dashed line) it will always import electricity. The horizontal axis depicts
the variable component of the comparative advantage that depends on
the quadratic term in the cost function. This part of the comparative ad-
vantage is constrained to the left by c2f qminf −c2hqmaxh , which occurs
when demand in the foreign jurisdiction is lowest and demand in
the home jurisdiction is highest. Demand in both jurisdictions isome Advantage
ome Diasdvantage
Home
Advantage
c2
f
 qf 2hqh
c2
f
 qmaxf 2hqminh
No Trade Region
Export
Always Export
(variable
with load)
d
{ +g
ading Patterns.
3 An earlier version of this paper employed data from Statistics Canada's Canadian Inter-
national Merchandise Trade database (CIMT), but this data set aggregates US import data.
46 W. Antweiler / Journal of International Economics 101 (2016) 42–51constrained by [qmin,qmax], and thus the dotted lines on the left and
right indicate the feasible range of the dynamic cost advantage. On the
right, this advantage is constrained by c2f qmaxf −c2hqminh , which occurs
when demand is highest in Foreign and lowest in Home. Foreign gains
a comparative advantage on the left side of the diagram, and Home
on the right side. The inequalities (10) appear as downward-sloping
45-degree lines. Above the (upper) blue line Homewill export electric-
ity (shaded blue area), and below the (lower) red line Homewill import
electricity (shaded red area). In the region between the two diagonal
lines no trade takes place because transmission costs exceed the
gains from trade. In the diagram the range [c2f qminf −c2hqmaxh , c2f qmaxf −
c2
hqmin
h ] has been centred around zero for illustration purposes. Depend-
ing on the exact parameters, these expressions could be asymmetric,
including all positive or all negative.
A particular pair of jurisdictions will operate on a horizontal line, for
example the thick green line in the diagram. This particular case illus-
trates a situation where Home has a slight ﬁxed-part advantage because
c1
f Nc1
h. As demand ﬂuctuates, the variable-part advantage moves along
the horizontal line between the minimum at point (a) and maximum
at point (d). If demand in Foreign is high and thus experiences highmar-
ginal costs of production, Home gains an increasing export advantage
moving from point (c) right to point (d). On the other hand, as demand
at home is high and demand abroad is low, Homewill shift further to the
left, eventually cross point (b) and start importing electricity. As demand
at home grows further, Home will experience increasing disadvantages
as it moves towards point (a). Between points (b) and (c), engaging in
electricity trade will not be proﬁtable because of the transmission costs.
2.3. The volume of two-way trade
The discussion above demonstrates that electricity trade can be uni-
directional or bidirectional over long time periods. While at any given
point in time (with a single intertie) electricity can only ﬂow one way,
over the course of a day, month, or year electricity can ﬂow in either di-
rection as demand changes in both jurisdictions—andmore sowhen de-
mand across both jurisdictions is not perfectly correlated, for example
because of different seasonal or diurnal patterns. For simplicity of expo-
sition, assume that home and foreign demand are distributed bivariate
normal with correlation coefﬁcient ρ so that
qh tð Þ
qf tð Þ
 
¼ N q
h
qf
" #
;
sh
 2
ρshs f
ρshs f s f
 2
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CA ð11Þ
Making use of the afﬁne transformation formula for multivariate
normal distributions, explained in the Technical Appendix B, one obtains:
u ≡ E xh
n o
¼
c f1 þ c2f q f
 
− ch1 þ ch2qh
 
−δg
ch2 þ cf2
ð12Þ
v2 ≡ V xh
n o
¼
ch2s
h
 2
−2ch2c
f
2s
hs fρþ c f2s f
 2
ch2 þ c f2
 2 : ð13Þ
Evaluating the truncated normal distribution provides expressions
for the total volume of Home's exports Xh and total volume of Home's
importsMh over time; see Technical Appendix C for details. Let ux denote
the version of Eq. (12) for exporting when δ=+1, and let um denote
the version of Eq. (12) for importing when δ=−1. Integrating over
time yields
Xh ≡
Z
xh N 0
xh tð Þdt ¼ ux þ v ϕ u
x=vð Þ
Φ ux=vð Þ
 
T: ð14ÞAnalogously, Home's volume of imports is given by
Mh ≡
Z
xh b 0
−xh tð Þ dt ¼ −um þ v ϕ u
m=vð Þ
1−Φ um=vð Þ
 
T: ð15Þ
The variance expression v2 is of crucial importance for determining
the volume of exports and imports: there is a positive sign in front of
v in the case of exporting and importing. By deﬁnition, ϕ(⋅)N0 and
Φ(⋅)∈ ]0 ,1[, and thus v always has a positive inﬂuence on Xh and Mh.
The larger the variance v2, the more bilateral trade. The correlation
coefﬁcient ρ plays an important role determining the variance v2. The
derivative of v2 with respect to ρ is clearly negative, which implies
that higher correlation diminishes trade. This is a very intuitive—and
essential—feature. If demand is strongly correlated between jurisdic-
tions, theywill both experience high demand and low demand simulta-
neously, and this leaves little room for additional trade. However, when
demand in both jurisdictions is correlated negatively, they can beneﬁt
from increased trade.
The derivation above gives rise to an expression for the trade inten-
sity, (Xh+Mh)/Qh, where Qh ≡ ∫qðtÞdt is total demand. For expositional
simplicity, it is expedient to ignore the transmission costs g so that
ux=um. Then
Xh þMh
Qh
¼ v
qh
ϕ u=vð Þ
Φ u=vð ÞΦ −u=vð Þ ð16Þ
When both jurisdictions are identical (same cost coefﬁcients, qh ¼
qf , and sh= sf), then u/v=0 and ϕð0Þ=Φð0Þ ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2=πp , and thus the
trade intensity simpliﬁes to
Xh þMh
Qh

h¼ f
¼ s
q
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4
π
1−ρð Þ
r
: ð17Þ
The trade intensity increases along with the coefﬁcient of variation
τ ≡ s=q and a decreasing coefﬁcient of demand correlation between the
two jurisdictions ρ.
Consider yet another simpliﬁcation where the two jurisdictions
are different in size by a factor of ζ so that qf ¼ ð1þ ζÞqh and sf=
(1+ζ)sh, but both exhibit the same coefﬁcient of variation τ ≡ s=q. Fur-
ther assume that their demand is perfectly correlated (ρ=1). Then the
trade intensity can be approximated as ζ/2 for reasonably small τ. This
means that size dissimilarity encourages more trade.
3. Empirics
The theory section of this paper has developed a model of two-way
trade in electricity that predicts instantaneous exports as well as the
volume of exports over a time period. Additional empirical tests can
be derived from theoretical predictions about trade intensity and trad-
ing prices. This section explores these three empirical avenues one by
one.
3.1. Data
For all data sources, trade in electricity is deﬁned asHarmonized Sys-
tem (HS) commodity code 271600. Themain source of bilateral month-
ly trade between Canadian provinces and US states is Canada's National
Energy Board.3
For Canada, electricity demand and generation as well as inter-
provincial trade in electricity has been obtained from Statistics
Canada's CANSIM database. The tables used include 172–0003 (electric
power generation, receipts, deliveries and availability of electricity,
Table 1
Bilateral trade estimation results.
Trade direction Both Both Exports
Intercept 0.347 (1.64) −1.681c (7.52) −0.404 (.970)
Importer load ratio ln(qj/Kj) 0.701c (8.37) 1.139c (7.34) 0.616c (6.01)
Exporter load ratio ln(qi/Ki) −0.993c (11.5) −0.498c (6.00) −1.937c (10.7)
Multilateral resistance ln(qi−/Ki−) −0.053 (.402)
Transmission distance ln(Dij) −2.410c (60.5) −2.174c (47.9) −2.626c (45.9)
Demand variability ln(Vij) 0.922c (17.1) 0.342c (4.89) 0.634c (7.17)
Importer hydro share % −0.009c (10.4) −0.012c (7.65)
Importer nuclear share % −0.006c (4.04) 0.012c (5.97)
Importer renewables share % −0.000c (6.18) 0.044c (8.35)
Exporter hydro share % 0.013c (15.7) 0.010c (8.10)
Exporter nuclear share % −0.004b (2.84) −0.009c (4.33)
Exporter renewables share % 0.000c (5.64) 0.000 (.867)
Time trend −0.015 (1.90) −0.016a (2.47) −0.006 (.646)
Observations 8819 8819 4827
Exporter & importer F.E. No Yes No
R2 0.410 0.494 0.518
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated by superscripts a, b, c, respectively. Standard scores (unsigned z-values) are shown in parentheses.
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nual data). Proﬁles of electricity generation by type are available in ta-
bles 127-0002 (monthly) and 127-0007 (annual). Table 127-0001
(terminated) contains monthly electric power statistics from 1950
through 2007. The data reported in these tables originates with
Canada's National Energy Board.
State-level electricity data in the United States were obtained from
the Electricity Data Browser of the U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion. State-level data are estimated and aggregated from reporting util-
ities and power generation facilities. Monthly data are available from
January 2001 onwards. Available tables cover generation (supply) and
sales (demand), but not inter-state deliveries.
Additional international trade in electricity data were obtained from
the United Nations COMTRADE database. This database records both vol-
ume and value of exports and imports, going back to 1988. However, data
prior to 2000 is spotty, and volume data suffers from reliability issues.
Distances between jurisdictions were calculated as population-
weighted harmonic averages based on populations and geographic lo-
cations of postal codes (United States: ZIP codes; Canada: FSA codes).
The Technical Appendix contains a table for distances between Canadian
provinces and US states. Whereas demand and supply (generation) are
observed directly, demand correlations4 and standard deviations were
computed using a rolling 36-month window. Available capacity was in-
ferred from generation data also through a rolling 36-month window.
This measure is arguably superior to nominal (name-plate) capacity of
generating stations, as the latter can be rather misleading. The ﬁnal re-
search data sets consists of 8819 monthly observations of province-
state exports (4827) and imports (3992) between 2001 and 2013.3.2. Bilateral trade in electricity
Because observed trade is aggregated to themonthly level, the most
direct way to test the theory in this paper is to estimate Eq. (14). How-
ever, this equation is non-linear due to the presence of the Mills
ratio—the ratio of probability density function and cumulative density
function. A simple identiﬁcation strategy helps transform Eq. (14) in
such a way that it leads directly to an estimating equation. The cost pa-
rameters c2i will tend to be different across jurisdictions. As Ki is ob-
served, deﬁne ci2 ¼ ~c2=Ki for each jurisdiction i, and assume that ~c2 is
the same across jurisdictions. Then the quadratic cost term varies with
qi(qi/Ki), the product of actual load and capacity utilization. This4 Correlation patterns may be different at different frequencies. The Technical Appendix
contains ﬁgures that illustrate load patterns at the hourly, week-daily, and seasonal level
for British Columbia. Seasonal correlation accounts for a large chunk of the cross-
jurisdictional variation, whereas week-daily patterns are similar across jurisdictions. Sea-
sonal correlations are inﬂuenced by the latitude and climate of jurisdictions.assumption can be justiﬁed with the observation that towards the
loadmaximumutilities use high-availability thermal plantswith similar
cost structure. Applying this identifying assumption to Eq. (9) for in-
stantaneous exports, the export-to-capacity ratio emerges as
xh
Kfh
¼ 1
2
qf
K f
−
qh
Kh
þ c
f
1−c
h
1−g
~c2
" #
ð18Þ
where Kfh≡2KfKh/(Kf+Kh) is the harmonic average of the generation
capacity in both jurisdictions. Deriving (18) is only one step towards
the estimating equation; section I in the Technical Appendix documents
all necessary steps. After applying the identifying assumptions to
Eqs. (12) and (13), the results are embedded in Eq. (14), and this equa-
tion is log-linearized. In addition to introducing the harmonic mean of
the generating capacity Kfh, the derivation also leads to a simpliﬁed ex-
pression for the joint standard deviation of electricity demand, normal-
ized by capacity. This expression appears as the square root in the
estimating equation
ln
Xijt
Kijt

 
¼ μ ij þ α0 þ α1 ln
qjt
Kjt

 
−α2 ln
qit
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−α3 ln Dij
 
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Here, parametersα1 through α4 are all positive to be consistentwith
the theoretical model. Furthermore, the theoretical derivation predicts
that parameter α4 should not exceed unity. The parameter μij captures
the comparative advantage differential in the c1 parameters and can
thus be either positive or negative. The parameter α3 captures the effect
of distance Dij on the trade volume and corresponds to the transmission
cost parameter g in the theory. A time trend (Tt) is added to capture in-
frastructure changes over time. The error term is εijt. The normalization
of the dependent variable (expressing it as an export-to-capacity ratio)
also removes much of the potential heterogeneity in the error term.
Econometric estimation of trade often involves ‘gravity’ models of
the type pioneered by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004). As
discussed in Head and Mayer (2014), state-of-the-art estimation tech-
niques make use of extensive dyadic ﬁxed effects, which identify eco-
nomic effects primarily through the time variation in the trade data.
While this approach is necessary because of the presence of multilateral
resistance effects in the love-of-varietymodels of trade in differentiated
products, it is not strictly necessary in the case of estimating Eq. (14).
Even though the estimating equation has pair-speciﬁc effects, they can
be captured through suitable economic variables. Unlikemultilateral re-
sistance, these pair-speciﬁc effects are generally observable.
Table 2
Trade intensity regressions—Canada.
Sample selection All TIb120% TIN0%
Estimation method WLS WLS WLS
Intercept 116.73c (16.8) 41.264c (17.9) 126.41c (16.0)
Share of hydro % 0.522c (17.7) 0.265c (27.4) 0.542c (16.4)
Share of nuclear % 0.356c (10.4) 0.215c (19.4) 0.367c (9.61)
Share of
renewables
% 0.000 (1.19) 0.001c (8.41) 0.000 (.859)
Demand Coeff.
of Variation
− 0.265 (1.03) 1.165c (14.0) 0.094 (.326)
Log average
demand
−13.82c (23.6) −5.764c (29.1) −14.71c (22.0)
Time trend a −1 −0.028 (.247) 0.070 (1.90) −0.031 (.247)
Observations 2319 2152 1816
Weights Avg. demand Avg. demand Avg. demand
R2 0.401 0.697 0.416
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as a ﬁxed or random effect for each trading pair. Alternatively, it can
be treated also as ﬁxed effects for each exporter and importer
(i.e., separate μi and μj). Lastly, μij can bemodelled explicitly with deter-
minants of comparative advantage, which can be approximated by the
composition of electricity generation, assuming similar underlying tech-
nologies. The composition of generation capacity by type (hydroelec-
tricity, nuclear, renewable sources, and fossil fuels) can be used to
capture the underlying comparative advantage. All four empirical strat-
egies are pursued, although with different level of emphasis, and with
some results relegated to the Technical Appendix.
Table 1 shows the results for estimating bilateral trade with regres-
sors for comparative advantage and reciprocal load smoothing. The ﬁrst
column employs the generation composition variables as proxies for
comparative advantage, while the second column uses a full set of ex-
porter and importer indicator variables. The third column only looks
at Canadian exports and introduces a further control variable. Crucially,
all speciﬁcations yield results consistent with the theory. The importer
load ratio has a positive effect, the exporter load ratio has a negative ef-
fect, and the demand variability parameter has a positive effect on bilat-
eral trade.
The bilateral identiﬁcation strategy in Eq. (19) can be augmented
through a variable that mimics ‘multilateral resistance’ in models of
trade in differentiated goods, deﬁned here as the capacity-weighted av-
erage of load factors of all US states within the same interconnection as
the export destination: q−i =K
−
i ≡∑l≠iql=∑l≠iKl . The estimate of this
‘multilateral resistance’ variable is negative (albeit not signiﬁcantly). Al-
ternative electricity sources compete with the exporter region, just as
one might expect in a multilateral setting. The Technical Appendix re-
ports additional estimates that employ random effects for the full
panel and subsamples, further supporting the theoretical predictions.
Distance has the expected negative effect, but the elasticity is signif-
icantly larger in magnitude (between −2 and −3) than in gravity
models of merchandise trade (around −1). Line losses alone cannot
possibly account for the large magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcient.
A plausible explanation is that physical distance approximates jurisdic-
tional distance. Crossingmore andmore jurisdictions (provinces, states,
municipalities) impedes the feasibility of building transmission capacity
considerably, even though right-of-way costs only account for about
10% of total project costs (Mason et al., 2012, p. 2–6). The potential for
NIMBY-type opposition increases with increasing length when beneﬁts
from a new transmission line accrue in distant locations. Fully account-
ing for the sources of the large distance effect should be the aimof future
research. As the inclusion of the ‘multilateral resistance’ term in the
third column in Table 1 documents, the large distance effect is notmere-
ly an artefact that results from neglecting the multilateral dimension of
electricity trade.
3.3. Trade intensity
Amore indirectmethod for estimating cross-border trade in electric-
ity focuses on trade intensity, the ratio of total trade (imports and ex-
ports) to demand TI≡(X+M)/Q. This ratio was introduced in Eq. (16).
The key insights from this discussion can be distilled into an estimating
equation for each jurisdiction i in time period t:
TIit ¼ β0 þ
XJ
j¼1
β j1
K jit
Kit
þ β2 ln Qið Þ þ β3
Si
Qi
þ β4Tt þ εit ð20Þ
the Jmeasures Kj/K capture the composition of electricity generation for
hydroelectric, nuclear, and renewable-source power. Trade intensity
and all shares will be expressed as percentages. The regressor ln(Qi)
captures the size of the jurisdiction, and the coefﬁcient of variation
Si/Qi captures the demand variability of a jurisdiction. The twomeasures
Si and Qi are the standard deviation of electricity demand and averageelectricity demand over the sample period, respectively. A time trend
Tt (time in years before or after 2005.0) is added to capture infrastruc-
ture changes that include grid expansion. Note that changes in compo-
sition are captured by the time variation in Kitj .
Because states and provinces are of signiﬁcantly different economic
size, it is sensible to weight the regressions accordingly. The reported
results will employ weighted least squares with average (long-term)
demand as weights. Data from the United States and Canada cannot
be pooled. Whereas Canada records electricity imports and exports
directly, the US trade intensity is imputed as the absolute difference of
demand and supply in a givenperiod. This imputation procedure under-
estimates actual electricity trade due to aggregation bias.
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of estimating Eq. (20) for Canada and
the United States, respectively. The ﬁrst column in both tables includes all
jurisdictions. As a robustness check, the second column suppresses obser-
vations with trade intensities in excess of 120%, which is indicative of ju-
risdictions that produce electricity primarily for export. The third column
suppresses observations where the trade intensity is zero or miniscule
(less than 1%). The panel used in both instances comprises all jurisdictions
in Canada and the United States and monthly data since 2001.
The estimating Eq. (20) predicts a positive effect from the coefﬁcient
of variation of electricity demand. The results in Tables 2 and 3 conﬁrm
this prediction, thus providing another crucial piece of evidence in sup-
port of the reciprocal load smoothing hypothesis. Jurisdictions with
more volatile demand are more eagerly engaging in electricity trade.
The results also indicate an interesting size effect. While size dissimilar-
ity is not captured directly in Eq. (20), smaller jurisdictions should trade
more than large jurisdictions. The results indeed conﬁrm that larger ju-
risdictions rely much less on trade than smaller jurisdictions. This
makes intuitive sense. Larger jurisdictions tend to be more diversiﬁed
in terms of generating capacity and may be better able to balance load
in different regions. Smaller jurisdictions need to rely more on their
neighbours to compensate for ﬂuctuating demand, or simply import
electricity from their bigger neighbours.
In Canada, jurisdictions with a higher proportion of hydroelectric
and nuclear power tend to increase their trade intensity. This may be
an indication of the comparative advantage of these technologies, or
the higher reliability and availability for satisfying base loads. In the
United States, nuclear and hydro power have similar effects when ex-
cluding states with the highest trade intensity. Interestingly, a larger
share of renewable energy is clearly associatedwith an increase in elec-
tricity trade. This result is consistent with the notion that intermittent
supply is leading to more load balancing across states.
3.4. Export prices
A further method for testing the model is through the use of the
price Eq. (8). Export prices are inﬂuenced positively by increasing load
Table 3
Trade intensity regressions—United States.
Sample selection All TIb120% TIN1%
Estimation
Method
WLS WLS WLS
Intercept 134.74c (36.8) 65.763c (25.4) 136.97c (37.0)
Share of hydro % −0.056b (2.69) 0.075c (5.24) −0.060b (2.82)
Share of nuclear % 0.022 (1.13) 0.236c (17.1) 0.012 (.589)
Share of
renewables
% 0.205b (2.68) 0.286c (5.49) 0.153a (1.99)
Demand Coeff.
of Variation
− 1.114c (10.7) 0.756c (10.6) 1.070c (10.1)
Log average
demand
−13.79c (35.9) −6.644c (24.4) −13.84c (35.5)
Time trend a −1 −0.013 (.155) 0.1111a (1.99) −0.002 (.021)
Observations 7956 7443 7712
Weights Avg. demand Avg. demand Avg. demand
R2 0.147 0.116 0.148
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated by
superscripts a, b, and c, respectively. TI stands for trade intensity. Standard scores (unsigned
z-values) are shown in parentheses. Additional OLS results in the Technical Appendix.
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with distance. Eq. (8) can be estimated linearly, but a log-linear version
may be more appropriate given that prices often have a long upper tail.
ln pijt
 
¼ γ0 þ μ i þ μ j þ γ1Tt þ γ2 ln
qjt
Kjt

 
þ γ3 ln
qit
Kit

 
þ γ4 ln Dij
 þ εijt ð21Þ
There are indicator variables μi and μj for all exporters and importers,
with one exporter and one importer jurisdiction each excluded as the
base. To be consistent with theory, the estimates of γ2, γ3, and γ4 all
have to be positive.
The available data reports both volume and value of exports and im-
ports. Prices can be calculated as monthly averages (unit values) by di-
viding value by volume. Summary data appear in the Technical Appendix.
There is signiﬁcant variation in prices alongwith occasional price spikes
such as those during the 2000–2001 California electricity crisis
(Borenstein, 2002). Price spikes in excess of $200/MWh and negative
prices were excluded from the analysis in this section.
Table 4 reports results for estimating Eq. (21). The ﬁrst column re-
ports linear OLS estimates. The second column (QREG) reports results
from a quantile regression of the median to allow for the long tail of
the price distribution. The dependent variable in both columns is
expressed in dollars per MWh. The third—and preferred—estimation
approach corresponds directly to the log-linear estimating Eq. (21).Table 4
Export Prices.
Estimation method OLS QREG OLS
Price variable mean median log
Intercept −0.207 (.058) 2.754 (.830) 4.349c (105.)
Load ratio exporter 48.641c (23.6) 48.415c (26.3)
Load ratio importer 24.078c (11.8) 21.076c (12.2)
Log load ratio exporter 0.811c (26.0)
Log load ratio importer 0.361c (11.6)
Log distance 0.454 (.442) −1.589 (1.48) −0.046a (2.13)
Time trend −2.446c (30.9) −2.465c (38.3) −0.056c (33.8)
Observations 8,550 8,550 8,550
Exporter + importer F.E. 43 43 43
R2 0.218 0.250
Note: Regression methods are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and quantile regressions for
the median (QREG). Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels
are indicated by superscripts a, b, and c, respectively. Standard scores (unsigned z-values)
are shown inparentheses. Estimates for exporter and importerﬁxed effects are not shown.
The base exporter province is Ontario, and the base importer state is New York.The estimated coefﬁcients of the exporter and importer load ratios are
both positive, fully consistent with theory. However, the exporter's
load ratio has about twice the effect on price than the importer's load
ratio. The effect of distance seems to have the wrong sign, but as
shown in the Technical Appendix, this sign is unstable and depends on
the trade direction. It has a positive sign for the larger Canadian export
to the US, and a negative sign for US exports to Canada. Distance seems
to play a more complicated role in price determination than the simple
model in this paper suggests. There is also a negative time trend in the
data. Electricity exports tend to get cheaper over time, despite the rising
cost of generation. Perhaps powermarkets inNorth America are becom-
ing more efﬁcient in dispatching electricity.
3.5. The extensive margin of trade
Cross-border trade in electricity exhibits different extensive
margins: across jurisdictions with respect to existing (or non-existing)
transmission capacity, and over time with respect to utilizing existing
transmission capacity. The ﬁrst type of extensive margin is dominant
as the set of province-state trading partners is small: just about 15% of
the total number of possible pairs. Estimating the extensive margin
yields predictable insights. Distance and availability of transmission in-
frastructure determine trading capability, and the separation into differ-
ent interconnections is a nearly perfect predictor of who can trade with
whom. The second type of extensive margin concerns observations of
zero trade in dyads that trade sometimes. These may indicate periods
when trading is unproﬁtable. This type of extensivemargin is consistent
with two-way trade in electricity and the no-trade gap in Fig. 5, but it is
difﬁcult to identify in monthly data because aggregation obscures no-
trade episodes throughout a month. If trade is more one-way (driven
by comparative advantage) than two-way (driven by reciprocal load
smoothing), transmission capacity will also tend to be more utilized.
4. The gains from electricity trade
‘Reciprocal load smoothing’ can generate economically meaningful
welfare gains. Fundamentally, these gains come from trading off
generation capacity and transmission capacity. Do potential welfare
gains strengthen the case for building a North American ‘supergrid’?
The case for increased integration is gaining signiﬁcant momentum
(Bowman et al., 2009; Carr, 2010; Goodman, 2010; Baker et al., 2011;
Bahar and Sauvage, 2013; Canadian Electricity Association, 2013). The
growing share of renewable energy is a key reason for expanding inte-
gration and transmission capacity; see Ambec and Crampes (2012)and
van Kooten et al. (2013) for a discussion of salient issues. A supergrid
may also provide greater reliability and redundancy. There are numer-
ous institutional issues and economic frictions that hold back the con-
struction of more transmission infrastructure. The most obvious is the
division of the North American transmission system into separate inter-
connections (shown in Fig. 2). Neighbouring states cannot exploit trad-
ing opportunities if they belong to different interconnections, andmore
distant states cannot exploit efﬁciencies from cross-continental delivery
of power.
This section cannot provide a concise answer about the current and
potential gains from cross-border electricity trade. Many of the current
gains are realized at the sub-monthly level, and potential future gains
from trade are contingent on modelling increased transmission capaci-
ty, and quantifying the cost of building more interties.5 However, it is
possible to sketch out the economic extremes of a fully uniﬁed grid
with pooled supply and zero transmission cost, and an autarkic grid5 (Kleit and Reitzes, 2008) provide an analytic economic framework, and (Doucet et al.,
2013) extend that approach and provides an application to a proposed Montana-Alberta
intertie. Encouragingly, they ﬁnd that the gains to transmission expansion are largely ap-
propriable. (Bresestia et al., 2009) shows how a network ﬂow optimization model can be
utilized to gauge the economic beneﬁts of network expansion.
Table 5
Load pooling in Canada (monthly scope).
Province Demand Std.Dv. Supply Surplus To U.S. Margin
Newfoundland 968 175 3459 2491 0 1.892
Prince Edward Island 98 7 11 −87 0 2.208
Nova Scotia 998 134 983 −15 −8 2.106
New Brunswick 1246 285 1301 55 105 3.372
Quebec 17,015 2718 15,536 −1479 1105 2.375
Ontario 11,924 1341 12,551 627 472 2.212
Manitoba 1931 323 2700 769 678 2.489
Saskatchewan 1682 216 1681 −1 −15 4.799
Alberta 5163 377 5001 −161 −35 3.649
British Columbia 5414 659 5409 −5 −69 2.272
All Canada 46,440 6236 48,633 2193 2234 2.566
(pooled) 5062 2.272
Note: Analysis is based on 2003–2012 period using monthly data. All but the last columns
report ﬁgures in GWh per month. The column ‘Margin’ reports the difference between
maximum load and average load in units of standard deviations.
50 W. Antweiler / Journal of International Economics 101 (2016) 42–51where each province or state is self-sufﬁcient. In a fully integrated con-
tinental grid, local demandwould be added up nationally and divided in
proportion to generation capacity across states or provinces. This would
smooth the ups and downs in the capacity utilization because the uni-
ﬁed load would vary more smoothly than the sum of local
variations—the familiar portfolio effect.With the covariances of demand
σij, the sum σ of standard deviations σi is larger than the pooled
standard deviation σ when demand is not perfectly correlated: σ ≡
∑iσ i N
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
∑i∑ jσ ij
q
≡ σ The difference in standard deviationsσ−σ be-
tween unpooled and pooled portfolio, multiplied by the desired safety
marginsm andm, identiﬁes the beneﬁt from pooling. The difference be-
tween autarky and friction-less pooled trade is σm−σm.
Table 5 backs out the pooling potential for Canada; for space consid-
erations the much longer table for the United States appears in the
Technical Appendix. For each province the table shows the average de-
mand, standard deviation of demand, supply (generation), and surplus.
For example, during the 2003–2012 averaging period, Newfoundland
and Labrador generated an average monthly surplus of 2.5 TWh.
Quebec's generation deﬁcit of 1.5 TWhwas balanced by importing elec-
tricity from Labrador, leaving roughly 1.1 TWh for export to the United
States. Canada's nation-wide surplus of 2.2 TWh was exported to the
United States. The last column shows the safety margin for each
province, deﬁned as the difference between maximum and average de-
mand expressed in standard deviations. For example, British Columbia's
required safety margin was 2.3 times its standard deviation of
659 GWh; these 1497 GWh amount to 28% of the province's generating
capacity.
The last two lines in Table 5 identify the beneﬁts from a nationally
pooled grid. A pooled grid would reduce the standard deviation from σ
=6236GWh toσ=5062 GWhpermonth, a remarkable 19% drop. The
pooled safety margin is also a bit smaller than the weighted average of
the individual safetymargins. The required contingent capacity is there-
fore 11.5 TWh instead of 16.0 TWh per month. On a nationwide level,
the 4.5 TWh/month difference is equivalent in size to about sevenmod-
ern nuclear reactors or a dozen large hydroelectric dams.6 But just how
muchmore trade—and intertie capacity—would a nationally-integrated
grid entail? Would the cost of building this intertie capacity come at a
lower cost than building seven nuclear reactors (about $50 billion) or
a dozen new dams (about $96 billion)?76 Figures are based on the Westinghouse AP1000 design, rated at about 600 GWh/
month, and the Hoover dam, which generates about 350 GWh/month.
7 This is based on projected costs for the Vogtle plant expansion in Georgia: $14 billion
for two AP 1000 reactors. By comparison, a new hydroelectric dam in British Columbia,
Site C, is expected to cost about $8 billion and is expected to generate 380 GWh/month.The equivalent gains from grid integration are signiﬁcantly larger in
the United States. The pooled standard deviation of demand is
29,567 GWh, compared to 35,257 GWh unpooled. After applying the
safety margins (2.286 pooled and 2.565 unpooled), the efﬁciency gap
is 22.8 TWh/month in reduced contingent capacity—the equivalent of
28 nuclear reactors or 65 Hoover dams! Of course, the existing grid al-
ready realizes some and perhaps many of these potential gains. The
gains from trade are likely larger because the available monthly data
only captures seasonal effects in the north–south direction. Over long
distances, east–west timezone shifts could provide signiﬁcant addition-
al intra-day gains from trade.
A supergrid can provide several other economic and environmental
beneﬁts. In the long term, jurisdictionswith a comparative advantage in
electricity production could build up generation capacity if they can de-
liver their electricity to more distant markets. Renewable energy
sources such as wind also require complementarities in generating ca-
pacity to make up for their intermittency. Hydro power (which can ac-
celerate or decelerate use of reservoirs) is a natural complement towind
and solar energy. Greater integration can also improve overall system
reliability. More importantly, integration may also provide an opportu-
nity for retiring polluting generating capacity. The 22.8 TWh/month ef-
ﬁciency gap in theUnited States translates into a signiﬁcant potential for
climate changemitigation. At a carbon dioxide intensity of about 1 t per
MWh for coal-ﬁred power stations, an annual efﬁciency gap of 273 TWh
translates into a potential for reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 273
million tonnes, or 5.2% of the US total of 5.3 billion tonnes in 2012.5. Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical model of two-way trade in
electricity dubbed “reciprocal load smoothing,” which more generally
constitutes a novel model of two-way trade in homogenous goods in
the presence of convexmarginal costs and stochastic but correlated de-
mand across trading partners. The model employs a fundamentally dif-
ferent economic logic than the familiar “reciprocal dumping” model in
which oligopolistic exporters subsidize rent-seeking entry into each
other's markets. “Reciprocal load smoothing” is amodel of international
trade as insurance. This model ﬁts into a novel stream of international
trade literature that explains variations in export entry and exit through
increasing marginal costs in the presence of stochastic demand and ex-
cess capacity, most notably Blum et al. (2013) and Blonigen andWilson
(2010). Whereas they focus on trade in heterogeneous goods, “recipro-
cal load smoothing” extends this literature to the case of a homoge-
neous good, and electricity in particular.
The theory of “reciprocal load smoothing” identiﬁes several features
of electricity trade. First, trade is one-way in the presence of strong
(conventional) comparative advantage in electricity production, and
trade tends to become more two-way when comparative advantages
between trading partners are more closely matched. Second, trade is
two-way in the presence of ﬂuctuating demand where exports and im-
ports follow the load difference between two jurisdictions. Trading op-
portunities increase with the variability of electricity demand over time
(due to seasonal or intra-day effects) and lower (or negative) correla-
tion in demand. Jurisdictional size differences also promote cross-
border trade. The empirical investigation of Canada-US cross-border
trade in electricity lends strong support to the theoretical model devel-
oped in this paper. Conventional comparative advantage and reciprocal
load smoothing work in tandem to explain the observed patterns of
cross-border trade in electricity.
Empirically, the volume of trade in electricity is subject to a much
steeper decline over distance than trade in merchandise goods. Where-
as the distance elasticity for the latter lies around−1, it is roughly twice
as high for electricity. Likely, physical distance captures ‘jurisdictional’
distance—the legal and administrative difﬁculties of building long-
distance interties—rather than transmission losses.
51W. Antweiler / Journal of International Economics 101 (2016) 42–51Whether the current level of electricity trade and continental inte-
gration of the electricity grid is sufﬁcient remains a rather important
policy question. Rough calculations of the trade potential—the differ-
ence between autarky and complete frictionless integration—suggest a
sizeable efﬁciency gap. Even realizing some of this potential could
help reduce greenhouse gas emissions signiﬁcantly. If recent improve-
ments in high-voltage direct current (HVDC) technology continue to
reduce the cost of long-distance bulk electricity transmission, a conti-
nental ‘supergrid’ may well become economically viable.
Appendix A. Supplementary information
The Technical Appendix to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.03.007.
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